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What I can not create I can not understand.  
(Text found on Richard Feynman’s blackboard at the time of his death).  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Computers are now a major tool in research and development in almost all scientific 
and technological fields, particularly in physics. Despite recent developments, this is far 
from true for learning environments in schools and in most undergraduate courses. 
After discussing how relevant is familiarization and reification in the learning of 
physics, this paper argues that computers must be used as cognitive artefacts, as tools to 
think with, i.e., as tools that allow students to learn physics by manipulating concrete-
abstract objects. The paper ends with a discussion how a lasting change in physics 
teaching and learning can be implemented. 
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Learning physics: conceptual difficulties, familiarization and reification 
 
Physics is a relatively new subject in the secondary curriculum (ages 13-18). Only in the 
second half of the 19th century did science education become part of the curriculum and 
only in our century did physics, or physics and chemistry, become an autonomous 
subject in the developed countries (Carvalho, 1985; Jenkins, 1991).  
Teaching and learning physics has always been considered a difficult task by most 
teachers and students and common people (McDermott, 1993; Peters, 1982). Some 
experienced policy analysts even say that physics/scientific literacy is a myth (Shamos, 
1995). Feynman, a famous physicist and a Nobel Prize winner, used to tell a story about 
a conversation with the Queen of Sweden during which she said, after asking what his 
field of work was: “Oh, well, we can’t talk about that. Nobody knows anything about 
physics.” Feynman, very politely, answered, “On the contrary, Madam, we can’t talk 
about physics precisely because somebody does know something about physics. What 
we can talk about is philosophy or psychology, because nobody knows anything about 
those subjects.” And “he would go on to say that subjects like philosophy and 
psychology are hard, but physics is easy and that’s precisely why we know so much 
about it” (Goodstein, 1992). But, as Goodstein says, “If physics is easy, the question is, 
why do we do so badly at teaching it?”  
Certainly, there are multitudes of reasons for that. One, surely not the least important, is 
that teachers soon face the “discovery of poverty” in their classrooms and that they 
somewhat naively tend to assume that kids are just as enthusiast on the curriculum as 
they are (Bruner, 1996).  
Besides the many social-cultural problems teachers face in their teaching, it can be 
argued that learning science, and physics in particular, is like learning a second 
language—a new language where words are not what they seem to be:  
(...) When dealing with the definition of terms we do well to remember 
how abstract are some of the concepts we use in physics. If we recall the 
difficulty that Galileo, a superb physicist, had in dealing with acceleration 
we may have more patience with our students (Ebison, 1993, p. 361).  
The language of physics was created in the last three hundred years. The history of 
physics is also an evolution of this language, the “invention of new vocabularies and 
new ways of talking about the world” (Gregory, 1988, p. 3). Physicists are aware that 
the language of physics is not the “proper” language to express themselves in many 
contexts. We all know, for example, that most of the language of physics is unsuitable 
to maintain an understandable social conversation about cold and hot things. Learning a 
second language is not a problem of knowing the structure of the grammar of that 
language. It is, essentially, a matter of familiarization with the language and its proper 
use in specific contexts. Familiarization is an important issue when learning science 
(and mathematics). And, for some eminent scientists, becoming familiar with is so 
important on the success of scientific ideas that new ideas only become triumphant 
because supporters of old ideas die, as Planck wrote in his autobiography:  
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(…) A new scientific truth does not triumph by converting its opponents 
and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually 
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it (Planck, 1950, 
pp. 33-34).  
There are some relevant arguments to support the importance of familiarization in 
learning, as contrasted with understanding. One is that scientists frequently say that they 
do not understand some of the most fundamental concepts or theories in their own field. 
For example, Feynman wrote that he didn’t know what force or energy really was and 
that no one really ever understood the theory of quantum mechanics… In an elegant 
manner, Feynman wrote (Feynman, 1982):  
We have always had a great deal of difficulty 
understanding the world view 
that quantum mechanics represents 
At least I do; 
because I’m an old enough man 
that I haven’t got the point 
that this stuff is obvious to me. 
Okay, I still get nervous with it...  
You know how it always is, 
every new idea, 
it takes a generation or two 
until it becomes obvious 
that there’s no real problem. 
It cannot define the real problem, 
therefore I suspect there’s no real problem, 
but I’m not sure 
there’s no real problem. 
Experienced physics teachers also alert us about our ignorance of the most fundamental 
issues in physics. In a very curious paper, Brian Davies, a well-known English physics 
educator, wrote:  
At the heart of the problem lies what amounts to a connivance among 
successive generations of teachers regarding the nature of their science 
approaches to understanding abstract concepts, leading to a self-defeating 
reluctance to open and share their partial understandings with their 
equally perplexed students.  
If I asked you, here and now, to write me a one- or two-paragraph 
explanation of your understanding of the nature of the Holy Ghost, you’d 
probably think it a tough challenge. If we then collected up your answers, 
we could be pretty sure that (i) they’d all be different, (ii) not one would 
satisfy all of us, and (iii), importantly, we’d be hard put to say which 
interpretation or explanation would be wrong, because there is no absolute 
in knowledge and understanding regarding The Holy Ghost.  
Most of the useful concepts of physics are, for teenagers, as mysterious 
and as difficult to grasp as the concept of the Holy Ghost: the nature of an 
electrostatic charge, of a magnetic field, of electromagnetic wave 
propagation in a vacuum, or of charm and colour are examples. There is, 
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as the Holy Ghost, no absolute understanding or knowledge of the nature 
of these intangibles, yet any half-curious young adult will ponder on their 
nature. In physics education we need much more of the kind of humility 
shown by Feynman, who said openly that he felt no one really understood 
quantum mechanics.  
If teachers continue to give the impression that they do have a better basic 
understanding of such fundamentals than their students, the students will 
see their own perplexity and uncertainty as a negative reflection on their 
own capabilities. Even in this group today there will be some of you who 
will remember the relief you felt when you could use some equation, and 
your mathematics, to answer a problem, rather than stay with your 
uncertainties regarding the concepts involved. We learn and teach others 
to use mathematics to manipulate the symbols associated with mysteries. 
This does not mean that we or they have a grasp of the mysteries 
themselves (Davies, 1997, pp. 420-421).  
Physics deals with a special type of “objects”: “objects” such as force, velocity, energy, 
radiation, etc. At a first glance, some, or even most, of these words seem familiar to a 
student. Nevertheless, they are not and they can’t be. Force, in the language of physics, 
is the “instantaneous rate of change of linear momentum”. The same sort of 
specifications is established for the other physics concepts. However, in the students’ 
first language (Portuguese, English or any other), force means many things and in many 
contexts, surely not “an instantaneous rate of change”!  
An important issue in learning such abstract concepts, one that is intimately related to 
familiarization is the issue of reification, i.e., of concretisation of abstract objects. 
According to Wright & Wright:  
Reification is a central goal [… of learning science and mathematics]; it 
essentially defines scientific literacy. It is the foundation for common 
sense about how the world works […] (1998, p. 128).  
Reification is an essential issue both for the learning of physics and mathematics as 
well. It is Roitman, a mathematician, which tells us that students can only learn at an 
abstract level when they consider mathematical objects as real as everyday objects:  
The objects of mathematics are real objects, in a psychological, not 
necessarily ontological sense—they feel real; we act as though they are 
real. For example, ‘number sense’ is based on reification: we can compare 
numbers, operate on them, and look at their properties because they are 
real. Or another example, many young children have not reified the notion 
of fraction—for them, 1/2 implicitly carries with it the question “1/2 of 
what?” When the concept of ‘1/2’ takes its place in the number system as 
just one of many rational numbers, to be thought about and used as we 
think about and use all rational numbers, it has been reified. (….) To take 
a third example, algebra cannot really be understood unless variables are 
reified—‘x’ is not a placeholder standing in for some unknown number, 
but an object in its own right. Reification cannot be forced, but its 
encouragement is a major part of the art of teaching mathematics 
(Roitman, 1998, p. 26).  
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Learning physics and the use of technology: cognitive artefacts and 
concrete-abstract objects 
 
Assuming reification and familiarization as essential aspects of learning physics (and 
mathematics), we must ask how can this be improved with technology and, specially, 
with computers? Hebenstreit, writing about the role of computers in education, coined a 
term that seems essential to understand how computers can help in the reification of 
knowledge. For Hebenstreit, computers allow us to manipulate a new type of objects, 
objects that he calls concrete-abstract objects. Concrete in the sense that they can be 
manipulated on the screen and react as “real objects” and abstract because they can be 
only physical or mathematical constructs such as vectors, equations, fields, etc. 
(Hebenstreit, 1987).  
Computers can be used in physics education as powerful cognitive artefacts (Norman, 
1991). A cognitive artefact is a tool to enhance cognition, a tool to create and explore 
“concrete abstract-objects”, a tool to create “worlds from ideas” and check how well 
these “worlds” can fit “real worlds”, or make sense of “imagined worlds”.  
Teachers tend to teach what they can teach, not necessarily what they think it would be 
useful to teach. This is what Osborne calls technological determinism (Osborne, 1990): 
“that which we do teach is limited by that which we can teach” (p. 193). He gives a few 
classic examples and shows how most of the practical and theoretical teaching is really 
dependent on the available technological devices and on the limited mathematics that 
students (and also teachers) can use: simple analytical tools but that need complex 
algebraic manipulation. He follows his line of reasoning to propose that:  
The advent of powerful computational tools in the past decade has 
resulted in more emphasis being placed on numerical methods of solution 
in physics. The study of chaos and the generation of Mandelbrot plots 
would have been severely limited without this technology. Yet school 
physics has yet to deploy such tools to enhance the education provided. 
Introductory kinematics courses place pre-eminence on the analytical 
solutions of objects moving with constant acceleration. My argument is 
that one implicit reason why this is done is because it is one physical 
situation that is accessible to an analytical solution with limited 
mathematics, another instance of that which can be taught, being taught. 
Yet the solution is lost in a confusion of algebraic manipulations whilst 
the numerical approach is, in a fundamental way, easier than the analytic 
approach.  
The alternative approach through numerical methods forces attention on 
the basic physics. It asks the child to consider what are the dynamics of 
the situation? How can the acceleration be predicted? How can the 
velocity be calculated if the acceleration is known and then how can the 
new position be calculated? The solution is then generated by iterative 
calculation and the pupil is forced into judging whether the answer 
suggested is appropriate. The rule used for calculating acceleration can 
easily be changed to incorporate friction or to model a harmonic 
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oscillator. Thus the emphasis is on the physics, not the mathematics. The 
issue that must he resolved is whether we should present pupils with 
problems of real-world complexity or adopt the reductionist approach, 
stripping the problem of anything but the simplest detail? The inevitable 
idealization of the latter approach, enhancing the separation of the world 
of physics from the real world of the child, again weakens our argument 
that physics can explain ‘how we know’ since the phenomena described 
are patently not commensurate with the child' s perception of reality 
(Osborne, 1990, p. 194).  
Osborne proposals only now seem feasible because hardware and specially software 
evolved to give us the possibility to emphasize meanings, even if complex calculations 
are necessary, in spite of simple analytical solutions that describe only idealized 
phenomena.  
A characteristic feature of using a computer as a cognitive artefact is that the emphasis 
is on meaning and semi-quantitative reasoning instead of algorithms and routine 
thinking. A good example of what is semi-quantitative reasoning can be done with the 
computation of, let’s say, sin (35º). Using a computer, or a calculator, we can easily get 
the result: 0.574. From a semi-quantitative point of view, let’s look if this result makes 
sense: it is smaller than 1 (OK!), is bigger than 0 (OK!); if I do a sketch of a 
trigonometric circle, I can easily estimate how big is the ratio between the segment that 
represents the sine value and the radius of the circle for an angle of 35º (a little more 
than 1/3 of the 90º angle…); with some sense of estimation, is possible to check that 
that ratio can be a little more than 0.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 How to estimate sin 35º? 
 
An expert—either student or teacher—can easily do this semi-quantitative reasoning 
even when either the teacher or the student never know how that value is really 
obtained! Moreover, they really do not think that is essential: it will not be of any help if 
you have a computer or calculator… The experts are experts when they can evaluate 
how reasonable that value is, not when they can compute it. Sure there is also place for 
a certain kind of experts that can think, let’s say, of better and faster algorithms to 
compute trigonometric functions, but that is not for the “rest of us”, who can, at best, be 
interested as a curiosity on such algorithms but understand that it is not the knowledge 
of the algorithms that help make sense of “sin (35º) = 0.574”…  
The same kind of semi-quantitative reasoning can be done with a mathematical object 
such as dx/dt = 4 × t. What does this inform us? First, we see that the rate of change of x 
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is proportional to t. So, for a bigger t, we will have a bigger rate of change. More 
precisely, when t is 5 units, for example, the rate of change will be, at that instant, 4 × 5 
= 20 units. If t is 10 units, then the rate of change will be 4 × 10 = 40 units. That is, if t 
doubles, the rate of change doubles. And x is always increasing, for positive values of t. 
Let us see another example: dx/dt = 4 × x. Now we have a rate of change of x that is 
proportional to x at any instant of time. For example, is x is zero, then the rate is also 
zero. For a positive value of x, at any instant of time, the rate of change is positive and 
so x increases.  
In addition to supporting semi-quantitative reasoning, cognitive artefacts also can play 
an essential role in externalisation and negotiation of learning, as mentioned by (Orhum, 
1995):  
The main function of cognitive tools is to enable learners to make explicit 
and negotiate meaning. Making meaning explicit requires the 
representation of thought processes in external models for examination 
and reflection, and it may help learners improve these cognitive processes. 
Negotiation of meaning involves exchanging views and interpretations in 
communicative acts among learners (p. 314).  
This view is coherent with the now dominant view of learning, the constructivist view.  
Since physics is a science where visualisation plays an important role, even when 
visualisation is only used to show mathematical objects, such as vectors or field lines, it 
seems very reasonable to suppose that computer visualisation can help learners create 
meaning from manipulations of abstract objects. This capability of computer have been 
extensively used in many contexts (e.g., in the beautiful TV-based course The 
Mechanical Universe, Goodstein & Olenick, 1988) and is stressed by many authors, 
such as Kozma, that points out the capability of making dynamic representations of 
non-concrete formal objects:  
Computers […] have the capability of creating dynamic, symbolic 
representations of non concrete, formal constructs that are frequently 
missing in the mental models of novices. More importantly, they are able 
to proceduralize the relationships between these objects. Learners can 
manipulate these representations within computer microworlds to work 
out differences between their incomplete, inaccurate mental models and 
the formal principles represented in the system (Kozma, 1991, p. 179).  
This trend accompanies the increasing importance computer visualisation and 
simulation is playing in science and in physics in particular. Galison, for example, wrote 
about the new “epistemic position” of computers and simulations in the production of 
physics knowledge:  
Computers and simulations ceased to be merely substitutes for mechanical 
parts, they come to stand in a novel epistemic position within the 
gathering of knowledge—not quite a piece of empirical machinery, and 
not quite one with theoretical apparatus (Galison, 1997, p. xix).  
Nickerson pointed out that researchers had not yet focused on students as authors of 
simulations:  
What has not yet received much attention from researchers is the 
possibility of having students develop simulations themselves as a way of 
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fostering a greater understanding of the processes they attempt to simulate 
(Nickerson, 1995, p. 16).  
He follows arguing that “it is only difficult, not impossible, and the work that goes into 
the successful building of a microworld is likely to deepen one’s understanding of 
whatever the microworld is intended to simulate” (Nickerson, 1995, p. 16). To build 
simulations, one can use programming languages, but these require technical knowledge 
and skill outside of the domain being simulated. This is the reason why Nickerson 
propose the development of specific tools that can be used by people without that 
knowledge:  
For student-developed simulations to be practical for educational 
purposes, it will probably be necessary to develop tools that are 
designated to facilitate the building of simulations by people without such 
language facility and programming experience (Nickerson, 1995, p. 16).  
There are still two other important aspects that must be considered about cognitive 
artefacts such as computer tools, mentioned by Bruner in some of his recent writings. 
Bruner says that the computer reintroduced the capability to make routine work without 
human “servants”. Bruner also points out that computers can be a kind of “intellectual 
mirrors”, in the sense of Schwartz (1989):  
One last word and I am done. I have said nothing about computers, which 
seems strange in this day and age. I really have nothing to say about them, 
aside from the fact that I love them and my life would be much more 
tedious without them. They can be a boon to scientific consciousness and, 
besides, they have reintroduced the servant in an era when the sages all 
said we would forever more the servantless. Best of all, we can construct 
programs that can ‘simulate’ what we might with great cost and effort do 
in our heads or on paper, and, in so doing, making us aware of what it is 
that we must still do ourselves in our own heads (Bruner, 1992, p. 12).  
 
Technological Change and Science Education 
  
When I started using computers with students, in the early 80s, it was not clear how 
important and ubiquitous computers would be in our society. Now we know that 
“computers have pervaded all aspects of life in the developed world, changing working 
practices and leisure activities” (Ross, 1993, p. 69). Everybody now agrees that young 
people and adults must “become aware and unafraid of computers, just as they need to 
become literate and numerate” (Ross, 1993, p. 69). Most of this familiarization with 
computers is done, especially with young people, without any formal teaching—just 
learning with peers in informal settings, like resource centres and homes.  
Ross also points out that it would be a waste of resources if we use computers just to 
develop computer literacy when we know that computers can help extend, improve and 
change the traditional curriculum significantly. And, more important, computers are 
now recognised as fundamental tools in the production of scientific knowledge:  
Scientific computation has become so much a part of everyday experience 
of scientific and engineering practice that it can be considered a third 
fundamental methodology of science—parallel to the more established 
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paradigms of experimental and theoretical science (National Research 
Council, 1989).  
Then, why should we not use extensively computers in teaching?  
Some authors, such as Cuban (Cuban, 1989), pointed out that computers, like all 
technological innovations in schools, tend to follow a cycle of four phases: high 
expectations; rhetoric about the need to innovate; oriented policy and finally limited 
use. This cycle is certainly true for innovations such as educational television but it is 
not true for other innovations such as radio or the teaching machines since for these 
there is a fifth phase: no use at all. It is also not true for computers, as Cuban himself 
seem to admit recently—see, e.g., the debate between Roy Pea, a strong advocate of the 
use of computers in education, and Larry Cuban (Pea & Cuban, 1998). Contrary to the 
other innovations, which declined very early after the first three initial phases 
mentioned by Cuban, computers are increasingly present in schools, as they are 
everywhere. For example, nowadays a school or university laboratory without data 
logging systems (computers, interfaces, sensors and software) is unthinkable. The same 
is true for school libraries: all have access to digital books, either off-line or on-line, at 
least in Portugal and in other European countries. Moreover, in the near future we will 
see an increase in the use of computers in education, at least in certain subjects such as 
mathematics and the physical sciences. For example, the Principles and standards for 
school mathematics (NCTM, 2000) now explicitly states the importance of technology 
in learning, considering the use of technology one of the six fundamental principles of 
teaching and learning:  
Technology principle: Technology is essential in teaching and learning 
mathematics; it influences the mathematics that is taught and enhances 
students’ learning (NCTM, 2000, p. 24).  
But it is not only mathematics educators and curriculum developers who reinforce the 
importance of technology in learning. For example, the new Institute of Physics project 
Advancing Physics uses computer tools and the Internet as an integral part of the 
curriculum (Ogborn, 1997).  
To understand the role of computers in education it is useful to use Pryluck’s distinction 
between “inherent” and “imposed” characteristics of a medium (Pryluck, 1968, p. 372). 
The first, inherent characteristics, are “symbols and combinations thereof selected from 
the symbol system that was developed in connection with the specific technology of 
transmission.” The second, imposed characteristics, are “situations of exposure (...), 
teachers’ instructions, or even the didactic structure of the presentation. They are 
imposed simply because one could easily remove them, apply them differently, or apply 
them to another medium.” Moreover, Pryluck reminds us that the imposed 
characteristics “at best correlates of the medium”. Since computers are now normal 
tools in the production and communication of scientific knowledge, their inherent 
characteristics seem unquestionable. This leaves us only with the discussion about the 
imposed characteristics, that is, the discussion about using computers in physics 
education (and, probably, in most school subjects) should not be a discussion about 
using computers but a discussion about how to use them.  
According to Collins (Collins, 1991), we can expect computers to help in the following 
eight shifts:  
1. A shift from whole-class to small-group instruction.  
2. A shift from lecture and recitation to coaching.  
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3. A shift from working with better students to working with weaker students.  
4. A shift toward more engaged students.  
5. A shift from assessment based on test performance to assessment based on 
products, progress, and effort.  
6. A shift from a competitive to a co-operative social structure.  
7. A shift from all students learning the same thing to different students 
learning different things.  
8. A shift from the primacy of verbal thinking to the integration of visual and 
verbal thinking.  
This list clearly relates to the “imposed” characteristics of computers in schools, not 
with the “inherent” ones. However, if we want technology to make a real difference, 
students must be in a state of ‘mindfulness’ for technology to work. Mindfulness, in this 
context, is the employment of non-automatic, effortful, and thus metacognitively guided 
processes (Salomon, Perkins, & Globerson, 1991).  
According to Salomon, computers are more than add-on devices since “computer tools 
carry with them implicit assumptions about self-guided exploration and design, even 
playful activity, team collaboration, integrated curricula, mutual consultation, and 
teachers’ orchestration of activities rather than teacher domination” (Salomon, 1992, p. 
251). He follows alerting us that “to make computer use affect education it cannot just 
be introduced as an addition to otherwise unchanging classroom practices the way, for 
example, television could; with its proper introduction everything in the classroom, 
possibly in the school as a whole, changes.”  
This helps us understand why it seems so difficult to make computers become part of 
regular practice in schools, particularly in classrooms. Computers are not add-on tools 
like television. Their use implies profound cultural changes—changes in the teaching 
culture, in the learning culture, in the school culture—as well as changes in the school 
organisation. If the dominant cultures of teaching, despite their diversity and evolution, 
are still essentially individualist—“teachers’ desire to be left to themselves” (Feiman-
Nemser & Floden, 1986, p. 522)—and defensive, the constraints for the generalisation 
of computer use in classrooms become evident, particularly when another characteristic 
of the culture of teaching is the use of “little research-based technical knowledge” 
(Feiman-Nemser & Floden, 1986, p. 522).  
But everything can change with time, social pressure and teacher involvement. It is also 
Feiman-Nemser and Floden who wrote that one particularly important change in 
progress in the culture of teaching is that the passive teacher moulded by the 
bureaucracy is being substituted by an “active agent, constructing perspectives and 
choosing actions” (Feiman-Nemser & Floden, 1986, p. 523). And the renovation of 
teaching and learning can only be done with teachers able to work in groups, open to 
learn continuously, open to learn and share difficulties with their students, open to 
criticism and improvement (Ponte, 1994).  
Some critics, such as Apple (1991), introduce a different perspective when analysing 
the role of the computers in education:  
At root, my claim will be that the debate about the role of the new 
technology in society and in schools is not and must not be just about the 
technical correctness of what computers can and cannot do. These may be 
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the least important kinds of questions in fact. At the very core of the 
debate instead are the ideological and ethical issues concerning what 
schools should be about and whose interests they should serve (Apple, 
1991, p. 61).  
These critics fear, for example, that computers will support the “the creation of 
enhanced jobs for a relative few and deskilled and boring work for the majority” 
(Apple, 1991, p. 65). This is, undoubtedly, an important issue, but a more general than 
the ones I am analysing on this paper. All members of our societies must be aware of 
this danger, not only educational researchers and teachers. Apple also alerts us that 
computers can be extensively used to “rationalise and control the act of teaching” 
(Apple, 1991, p. 66). This is certainly true for computer uses such as computer-managed 
instruction, but not for exploratory environments and other computer tools. On the 
contrary, these tools give more control to teachers and can help them be more creative 
on the management of the curriculum. This can be exactly the opposite of what Apple 
fears, the “deskilling of teachers”:  
Of the major effects of the current (over) emphasis on computers in the 
classroom one may be the deskilling and depowering of a considerable 
number of teachers (Apple, 1991, p. 67).  
Apple is right when he says that new technologies embody a form of thinking, primarily 
technical thinking:  
The new technology is not just an assemblage of machines and their 
accompanying software. It embodies a form of thinking that orients a 
person to approach the world in a particular way. Computers involve ways 
of thinking that under current educational conditions are primarily 
technical. The more the new technology transforms the classroom into its 
own image, the more a technical logic will replace critical political and 
ethical understanding. The discourse of the classroom will center on 
technique, and less on substance. Once again ‘how to’ will replace ‘why,’ 
but this time at the level of the student. This situation requires what I shall 
call social, not technical, literacy for all students (Apple, 1991, p. 75).  
But it is not linear that technical and not technical thinking are opposite ways of 
thinking. Most of the times, intelligent thinking is done with tools and it is not possible 
to separate intelligence from tools:  
Almost any form of human cognition requires one to deal productively 
and imaginatively with some technology. To attempt to characterise 
intelligence independently of those technologies seems to be a 
fundamental error (Olson, 1986, p. 356).  
In a certain way, Apple recognises that sooner or later computers will be normal tools in 
schools. In this case, students should not only be technically proficient but also “have a 
serious understanding of the issues surrounding their larger social effects” (Apple, 1991, 
p. 75). Social literacy must have a considerable importance in the curriculum:  
Where are computers used? What are they used to do? What do people 
actually need to know in order to use them? Does the computer enhance 
anyone's life? Whose? Does it hurt anyone's life? Whose? Who decides 
when and where computers will be used? (Apple, 1991, p. 76). 
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Another point raised by Apple, teacher education and new technologies, must always 
have a clear goal: teacher education is about “skilling”, not deskilling; about giving 
power to control technology, not giving technology to control teaching.  
There have been many promises of radical change in education for educational 
technologists, researchers and computer enthusiasts. For example, one of the early 
advocates of computers in education, Patrick Suppes, wrote in 1966 that “in a few more 
years millions of school children will have access to what Philip of Macedon enjoyed as 
a royal prerogative: the personal service of a tutor well-informed and responsive as 
Aristotle” (quoted by De Corte, 1994, p. 206). We know now that is not feasible, at least 
in the foreseeable future. The enthusiasm with intelligent tutoring systems is something 
of the past. In the 1990s, a “clear transition has been initiated in educational computing 
in general (…) toward supportive systems that are less structured and less directive, that 
are more focussing on coaching and scaffolding” (De Corte, 1994, p. 116). Groups such 
as the group that worked with the Education Technology Center in Harvard between 
1985 and 1995 have initiated this perspective. Their goals were, for the time, counter-
current, but are now dominant. The Harvard perspective was based on four principles:  
Goals: Focus on key concepts and on the overall nature of knowledge, 
evidence, and inquiry in a discipline. 
Teaching Approaches: Help students develop a deep understanding of the 
subjects they study by taking into account their prior theories and by 
integrating teacher-directed instruction with opportunities and challenges 
for critical inquiry. 
Technology: Use technologies selectivity to make a distinct contribution 
to teaching and learning, for example, to present dynamic models of key 
ideas or to enable students to participate in disciplined inquiry. 
Implementation: Design technology-enhanced teaching modules and 
approaches that can be gradually and gracefully integrated into existing 
curriculum and practice (Harvard Educational Technology Center, 1988). 
As we can see in these statements, technology is not a goal in itself but a selective 
contribution “to make a distinct contribution to teaching and learning”. This 
contribution can, in many circumstances, be a “Trojan horse” to change education 
(Schwartz, 1993). But, as many authors point out, is the teacher that really can make the 
difference in creating powerful educational environments with technology. Or, as 
Hooper, one of the British pioneers of research in computers in education, stated in an 
interesting paper (Computers and sacred cows):  
(…) the teacher as human being is both the form and content of education, 
both means and end (Hooper, 1990, p. 4). 
Compared with other institutions and areas of work, schools are less influenced by 
technologies. Cuban (1993) presents two reasons for that: one is what he calls “cultural 
beliefs” about what teaching is and how learning and teacher-student relationship 
occurs. He argues that popular views of proper schooling emphasise the role of the 
teacher, not the role of a machine. A second reason is the organisation of the age-graded 
school, with sequences of 50 minutes classes, that “has profoundly shaped what 
teachers do and do not do in classrooms”. To Cuban, using computers in traditional 
organizational schools is an almost impossible task. Only a minority of “enthusiastic 
teachers” can do it. And, in present circumstances, he is probably right, even with 
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innovations such as using computers as data-logging tools, as Rogers & Wild pointed 
out:  
Despite the fact that the software and hardware tools for this type of 
activity are now refined and very easy to use, school science departments 
have been rather slow to adopt data-logging technology. The reasons for 
this reticence are often cited as a mixture of limited funds, limited time 
and limited training opportunities for science teachers. It t is also possible 
that limited awareness of the learning benefits has caused a failure to gain 
the professional commitment of teachers (1996, p. 130).  
It can be difficult to “gain the professional commitment of teachers” when research 
shows that the effective use of Information Technologies (IT) needs substantial 
demands on teachers and schools as pointed out in a large scale evaluation in UK:  
Overall indications were that in particular circumstances the use of IT had 
a highly positive impact on children’s achievement, but this was not 
without substantial demands on teachers and schools (Johnson, Cox, & 
Watson, 1994).  
This high level of demand, this “high threshold of effort” (Wilson, 1997, p.24) for 
teachers and schools is recurrently considered as major obstacle for the regular use of 
computers.  
But technological innovations in schools have always been very slow and not only due 
to teachers but also to cost. Computers are expensive commodities as paper was some 
centuries ago:  
The high cost of paper stimulated the use of substitutes—the wax tablet, 
the slate, the smooth wooden board, as well as the board painted black. 
Even these developments were slow. Brinsley mentions the blackboard in 
his Ludus Literarium of 1612, Comenius had pictured one in 1658, but we 
have no record of its use in schools until about 1800, and no mention is 
made of slates for individual pupils until about 1815. Again and again the 
records of the early schools disclose the complaints of the parents over the 
cost of each new innovation, and the introduction of student slates was the 
cause of public disturbances (Brooker, 1949, p. 12).  
Other difficulties with the introduction of a proper use of computers can be related to 
the fact that empowering environments—such as Logo—have been replaced by more 
appealing multimedia presentations. According to Robertson (1998), this is due to the 
fact that investment on support for teachers and curriculum development based on 
educational research on computers has almost disappeared. Schools manage their own 
budgets and buy directly to publishers—the trend is buying what is more “attractive”, 
not what can help explore the potentialities of the technology to help create powerful 
learning environments.  
It seems reasonable to admit, with Joyce (1974, p. 411) that the “structure of the school 
is in many senses the medium of instruction—it facilitates certain kinds of learning 
modes and inhibits others”. Joyce gives the example of programs such as “Sesame 
Street” that “would not have anywhere near the effect they are having if there were not 
television sets in most homes and if the parents were not delighted to have the children 
occupied before them”. Would it be possible to change the structure of the school? A 
change in the direction of more active engagement of learners in their own learning, a 
change in the direction of the transformation of schools and classrooms in communities 
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of situated practice, in the sense given by Brown et al. (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 
1989)?  
Computers are commonly associated to fun and enjoyment, including in learning 
environments. Learning can certainly be fun but, in most cases, is slow and difficult. If 
we want students and teachers to use computers as learning tools they must be aware 
that popular myths can be true for games and browsing through most of multimedia 
titles, but are certainly not true when reflection and hard work is needed (Stoll, 1995). 
Using computers as scientific tools is a demanding experience, as is all scientific work, 
both for students and teachers.  
Recent research in innovation and knowledge dissemination tend to insist on “a social 
constructivist approach to dissemination and use of knowledge” (Hutchinson & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 43). Users are not passive recipients of novelties and it is not 
possible to transfer expertise and information as we transfer bits and data. As a matter 
of fact,  
(…) work on organizational life has shown clearly that, within any given 
social setting, there are a sufficient number of tensions, differences in 
perception, differences in influence or authority, etc., to preclude any 
straightforward communication of information or innovation. A 
constructivist view of knowledge use also shows us that users must 
transform inputs simply to apprehend them, even if they are as unaware of 
the process (…). When we look at outcomes, then, we must assume that 
users have reconfigured their understanding and use of a given practice 
simply to integrate it into their repertoire (Hutchinson & Huberman, 1994, 
p. 43).  
No longer we need short-term programs that assume that innovation is granted because 
is has proven with the enthusiastic. We need programs that “encourage cumulative 
improvement over the long haul” (Holton, 1994), committed to ongoing slow but clear 
change. “Cumulative improvement” is, certainly, a more reasonable view to envision 
how computers tools will be assimilated and change learning and teaching. Our modern 
institutions are profoundly dependent on abstract systems, what Giddens calls “expert 
systems” (1991). Computers and computer networks are good examples of these expert 
abstract systems. Their potential and social impact is enormous and will increase as 
technology advances. But, as Papert pointed out twenty years ago, “there is a world of 
difference between what computers can do and what society will choose to do with 
them” (Papert, 1980, p. 5). In the near future, we all face the challenge to use 
technology to empower learning (and all other human activities), not to create any kind 
of Aldous Huxley Brave New World, where machines control everything, dehumanising 
schools and learning.  
Note: This paper is based on a chapter of the PhD thesis Teodoro, V. D. (2003). 
Modellus: Learning physics with mathematical modelling. Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa, Lisboa. 
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